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A B S T R A C T 
Flexible-term highway concessions are becoming quite popular around the world as a 
means of mitigating the traffic risk ultimately allocated to the concessionaire. The most 
sophisticated mechanism within flexible-term concession approaches is the least present 
valué of the revenues (LPVR). This mechanism consists of awarding the concession to the 
bidder who offers the least present valué of the revenues discounted at a discount rate 
fixed by the government in the contract. Consequently, the concession will come to an 
end when the present valué of the revenues initially requested has been eventually 
reached. The aim of this paper is to evalúate the effect that the discount rate established 
by the government in the bidding terms has on the traffic-risk profile ultimately allocated 
to the concessionaire. To analyze this effect, a mathematical model is developed in order to 
obtain the results. I found that the lower the discount rate the larger will be the traffic risk 
allocated to the concessionaire. Moreover, I found that, if a máximum term is established in 
the contract, the lower the discount rate, the less skewed towards the downside will be the 
traffic-risk profile allocated to the concessionaire. 
1. Introduction 
Investment in public infrastructure is a key factor for promoting economic growth (Aschauer, 1989; Aghion et al, 1999). 
Many countries around the world are seeking new means to involve the prívate sector in managing and financing infrastruc-
ture through public-private partnerships (PPPs). Three reasons lie behind this trend: first, the growing budgetary constraints 
experienced by many economies in the world, which led them to look for resources outside of the public budget; second, the 
search for greater productive efficiency in the provisión of public goods; and third, the improvement of quality through a 
better allocation of risks and incentives (OECD, 2008). 
One of the most common ways of implementing prívate participation in managing infrastructure is through the conces-
sion approach, which consists basically of transferring construction, maintenance, and operation of the infrastructure to a 
prívate consortium, in exchange for which that consortium receives the right to charge a user fee, for a period of time, fixed 
or variable, as contractually agreed upon in advance. Infrastructure concessions incorpórate some features that distinguish 
them from other construction and maintenance contracts, and also from the basic asset privatization procedure (Vassallo 
and Gallego, 2005). 
One of the major concerns regarding infrastructure concessions in the last few years is that of calculating how best to 
allocate traffic risk. On the one hand, traffic seems to depend to a great extent on faetors that are beyond the control of both 
the concessionaire and the government. On the other hand, forecasting traffic accurately has proved to be a real challenge for 
both planners and prívate companies (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005; Bain and Polakovic, 2005). 
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In addition, concession contracts that fully allocate traffic risk to the concessionaire seem to be particularly prone to rene-
gotiation. Based on the case study of highway concessions in Spain, Baeza and Vassallo (2010) show how concessionaires 
tend to put pressure on the government to renegotiate concession contracts when the real traffic turns out to be lower than 
originally calculated by the concessionaire. As Guasch et al. (2008) points out, renegotiations are unfortunately quite com-
mon in concession contracts, and they are initiated not only by the concessionaire, but also by mutual agreement between 
the government and the concessionaire. 
In order to avoid future renegotiations and establish a more rational and fairer traffic risk allocation, many governments 
all around the world are introducing mechanisms to mitígate traffic risk in highway concessions (Vassallo, 2006). One of the 
most interesting mechanisms to mitígate traffic risk is the establishment of flexible-term contracts. The main characteristic 
of this approach is that the contract will end when a predetermined amount of accumulated revenues, as fixed by the terms 
of the contract, is ultimately reached. 
The most sophisticated approach within the range of flexible term mechanisms is the "least present valué of the reve-
nues" (LPVR) mechanism, which has been developed and studied in detail by Engel et al. (1997, 2001). This approach intro-
duces a discount rate to calcúlate the accumulated revenues. Even though this mechanism has been very well received by 
academics, its practical implementation has been infrequent, mostly because of the strong opposition to LPVR by concession-
aires (Vassallo, 2006). 
This paper discusses the influence that the LPVR discount rate /?, which is established by the government in the contract, 
has on the calculation of the traffic risk that is ultimately allocated to the concessionaire. In the first section of the paper, 
after the introduction, I describe the characteristics of the flexible-term concession contracts, and analyze the data on the 
implementation of this mechanism around the world. In the next section, I develop a mathematical model intended to estí-
mate the sensitiveness of the return r¡ obtained by the concessionaire in terms of/? for different traffic scenarios. Then, I apply 
the model to a hypothetical case study, and analyze the results derived from it. In the last section, I discuss the results, and 
then offer some concluding remarks. My chief conclusión in this paper is that the lower the discount rate used by the gov-
ernment, the higher will be the traffic risk actually allocated to the concessionaire. This conclusión makes sense intuitively 
since the lower the discount rate the greater the valué placed on future earnings, and consequently the greater the risk trans-
ferred to the concessionaire because more weight is now being assigned to future earnings. 
2. Flexible long-term concession contracts 
2.Í. Theoreticalfoundation 
The theoretical foundation of flexible-term concession contracts is quite straightforward. The idea is to tie the duration of 
the concession contract to the achievement of a certain goal previously established in the contract. One approach is to tie the 
concession duration to the number of users or to the accumulated revenues obtained by the concessionaire. In other words, 
the concession contract will end when a certain number of vehicles have used the highway or when the concessionaire has 
received a certain amount of revenues from the users. Consequently, if traffic ultimately turns out to be higher than ex-
pected, the duration of the concession contract will be reduced from what had originally been estimated. And the reverse 
is also true. In cases where the actual traffic turns out to be lower than what had been estimated, the concession contract 
will be extended. 
This approach means a substantial mitigation of the traffic risk that is actually allocated to the concessionaire com-
pared to fixed-term contracts. However, traffic risk is not fully mitigated by using this approach for two reasons. First, 
the maintenance and operation costs accumulated throughout the life of the contract become larger for the concessionaire 
when the concession contract becomes longer and vice versa. And second, the revenues obtained at the beginning of the 
contract will have a higher valué for the concessionaire than those obtained at the end of the contract. As a consequence 
of these two issues, if in the end the actual traffic is higher than expected, the return obtained by the concessionaire will 
be a little bit higher than the return that would have been obtained with a fixed-duration contract. In the opposite case, 
when the actual traffic turns out to be lower than expected, the return obtained by the concessionaire will be a little bit 
lower. This means that the ultímate return will go up and down with traffic fluctuations, but not as much as it would 
have, in either direction, if a fixed-term contract had been implemented. This traffic risk allocation profile makes sense 
from the standpoint of the theory of incentives since the concessionaire will still have an incentive to bring more traffic 
to the concession. 
Engel et al. (1997, 2001) made two substantial contributions to the approach outlined above. First, they suggested dis-
counting the revenues at a discount rate set up in the contract (present valué of the revenues) in order to reflect the different 
valué that revenues have for the concessionaire at different times. Second, and perhaps more important, they proposed to 
use the present valué of the revenues (PVR), not only as a means of mitigating traffic risk, but also as the key variable to ten-
der the concession contract. This way, the bidder who in the end requires the least preset valué of the revenues will be 
granted the concession contract. This is what Engel, Fischer, and Galetovic called the "least present valué of the revenues" 
(LPVR) mechanism. 
Let me explain in greater detail how this mechanism works. Eq. (1) shows the net present valué estimated by one bidder 
attending the tender in terms of the most relevant variables that determine the economic balance of a concession contract. 
NPV0 = -/0 + g^M-^ (1) 
U (1 + r)1 
where NPV0, net present valué calculated in year 0; J0, initial investment estimated by the bidder (capital cost); r, weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC); n, concession term; p¡, price or toll in year ¡; <7i(p¡), actual traffic estimated by the bidder in 
year i depending on p¡; m¡, maintenance and operation costs estimated by the bidder in year i. 
Each bidder will try to make his bid as competitive as possible in order to have the greatest chance of being awarded the 
concession. The most competitive bid under this restriction is always made when NPV0 = 0. Making Eq. (1) equal to zero and 
restating its terms, I obtain Eq. (2). 
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The left side of this equation shows the discounted costs that the bidder expects to bear in operating and constructing the 
concession for the duration n, whereas the right side shows the present valué of the revenues (PVR) that the bidder expects 
to obtain along the contract duration. The point at which the two terms of the equation are equal means that the concession 
has covered all its costs—according to a cost of capital equal to r. 
The auction mechanism based on the LPVR consists of granting the concession to the bidder that requires the lowest pres-
ent valué of the revenues to recover its costs. The concession will end when the real discounted flow of revenues reaches the 
level required by the concessionaire. If the real traffic is ultimately lower or higher than expeeted, the ultimate duration of 
the concession will be either extended or reduced. 
In the last few years, some academics have proposed slight modifications of the LPVR mechanisms. Nombela and de Rus 
(2004) proposed using the least present valué of the net revenues (LPVNR) instead of the LPVR to procure concession con-
traets. Vassallo (2004) suggested the possibility of using short-term concession contraets of fixed duration awarded under 
the LPVR approach. Once the contract has expired, the government will pay to the concessionaire the difference between 
the LPVR requested and the LPVR obtained at the end of the contract. 
2.2. Practical experience around the world 
The use of flexible-term concession contraets was reported for the first time in the case of the concession contract for the 
Second Severn Bridge in the United Kingdom, which was awarded in 1990. The length of the concession was pegged to a 
fixed target of "Required Cumulative Real Revenue" (Foice, 1998). This way, a figure was established, in 1989 prices which, 
once collected from toll income, would bring the concession to an end. Another similar experience is the Lusoponte conces-
sion in Portugal, which was awarded at the end of the 1990s. The concession agreement was designed so that the concession 
would expire no later than March 2028 or once a total cumulative traffic flow of 2250 million vehicles had been reached 
(Lemos et al., 2004). 
Other countries have also implemented flexible-term concession approaches. The government of Colombia decided to 
move from fixed to flexible-term concession contraets at the end of the last decade. The first project to be awarded under 
this approach was the "Malla Vial del Valle del Cauca," which will expire when the concessionaire reaches the accumulated 
revenues—not discounted—requested in the tender, subject to a máximum duration (Benavides, 2008). The accumulated rev-
enues required were also used as one of the key variables in the tender phase of the concession, though not the only one. 
From then on, many concession contraets have been awarded using this approach, particularly in the last few years. Right 
now, it is still too early to properly assess how this mechanism actually works since most of the contraets are either in 
the construction phase or in the first few years of operation. 
In the last few years, due to budgetary constraints, Portugal has moved from shadow toll concessions to real toll conces-
sions. This fact encouraged the government to implement traffic risk mitigation mechanisms. For this reason, the Litoral Cen-
tro Highway in Portugal was awarded under the LPVR approach. The concession will come to an end when the net present 
valué of the total revenues reaches €784 million, subject to a minimum period of 22 years and a máximum period of 30 years. 
The concession ends after 30 years, regardless of whether the consortium reaches the PVR initially requested or not. Since 
the award of this concession, however, use of the LPVR has been discontinued in Portugal owing to the opposition of poten-
tial concessionaires. 
Undoubtedly, Chile is the country where there has been the greatest experience in the implementation of the LPVR mech-
anism in the way that Engel, Fischer and Galetovic designed it. The Chilean Public Works Concession Law defined the pos-
sibility of using the sum of total revenues—discounted or not—to be required by the concessionaire as the main economic 
variable for tendering concessions. From then on, the LPVR has been used as a procurement mechanism in some highway 
and airport concessions in Chile. The bidding terms of the concessions awarded in Chile on the basis of the LPVR approach 
allowed the concessionaire to choose either a fixed or a variable discount rate. 
The first concession using LPVR in Chile, and also the most successful, was the Santiago-Valparaiso highway (Route 68). 
An analysis of the procurement process of this highway can be found in Gómez-Lobo and Hinojosa (2000). The fixed rate was 
set in the bidding terms as a risk-free rate of 6.5% plus a risk premium of 4%. The variable rate was set as the monthly average 
real risk-free rate plus a 4% risk premium. Four bidders attended the tender. Three of them chose the fixed discount rate 
whereas only one of them chose the variable one. 
The second attempt to tender a highway eoneession in Chile under the LPVR mechanism took place at the beginning of 
1999. The highway selected was the Costanera-Norte, an urban expressway in Santiago, which was a very risky project for 
several reasons. First, it was located in an urban área, thus competing with other roads and means of transportation. Second, 
part of the highway was built on a subterranean level. And third, there was public opposition to the project by residents of 
some city neighborhoods. Only one consortium presented an offer and it was ultimately disqualified because the guarantee 
bond offered was below the level established in the bidding documents. This experience proved that the LPVR was not a ma-
gic wand, able to get very risky projeets off the ground without public support. From then on, some road and airport projeets 
have been awarded under the LPVR approach. However, in spite of the interest in this mechanism, in the last fifteen years, 
only four road concessions out of the 28 presently granted were successfully awarded under the LPVR. The main reason why 
this attractive mechanism has not been implemented more often in Chile, Portugal and other countries is the strong oppo-
sition from concessionaires (Vassallo, 2006). The main reason put forth by the concessionaires to explain their opposition to 
implementation of this mechanism is that LPVR sets a cap to the upside while it does not, at the same time, set a floor to the 
downside. The downside is caused by the fact that eoneession legislations and eontraets (such as the ones in Spain, Portugal 
and Chile) tend to establish a máximum duration for eoneession eontraets. Consequently, while the duration of a contract can 
be always reduced to mitígate the upside, the necessary extensión to avoid the downside in the case of a traffic shortfall is 
not guaranteed beyond the máximum contract duration. As Brealey et al. (1996) claim, private shareholders expect a large 
upside that compensates for the possibility of losing all their capital in very risky and highly leveraged projeets. The traffic-
risk profile resulting from reliance on the LPVR approach turns out to be just the opposite of the profile desired by would-be 
sponsors since the upside is very small while the downside remains significant. 
3. The role of the discount rate 
The objective of this section is to know how the discount rate /? used by the government in tendering a eoneession contract 
under the LPVR approach influences the return r¡ ultimately achieved by the concessionaire for different traffic scenarios. To 
that end, in this section, a mathematical model is developed to relate /? to r¡ when traffic estimates turn out to be inaecurate. 
Once the model has been defined, I apply the model to a hypothetical case in order to visualize and assess the results. 
3.1. Definition of the model 
The net present valué of a eoneession business is given by Eq. (1). This equation is defined in terms of discrete time units. 
This means that all the revenues and costs produced in a specific year are supposed to be concentrated at a particular point. 
In order to carry out a more thorough analysis, it is useful to express this equation on the basis of continuous time units by 
using the continuous interest formula. This way, the length of the compounding period is reasoned to be infinitely small. This 
approach will enable the model to obtain more aecurate results in determining the ultimate length of the contract. Eq. (3) is 
obtained by replacing the discrete time interest formula by the continuous time one. This way, the former variable i, used to 
refer to a discrete number of years, is replaced by the variable t, which refers to continuous time units. 
NPV0 = -¡0+ [ \p(t) • l(p(t),t) - c(t)] • e-rtdt (3) 
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In order to simplify the model, I make two assumptions. First, I assume that inflation is either non-existent or grows at a 
constant rate, which enables me to use real, instead of nominal, monetary units from the present, and going forward. Second, 
I consider that the price or toll does not vary in real terms throughout the Ufe of the contract, sop does not depend on t. This 
assumption is not far from the reality since most of toll road eoneession eontraets incorpórate price caps indexed so as to rise 
at the same rate as inflation. 
Traffic flows depend on variables such as the population growth in the área around the infrastructure, the income per 
capita of the population, the competition with other infrastructure facilities, the price of gasoline, and so on. Traffic depends 
also on the toll p imposed, which is a variable explicitly included in the model. However, according to the previous hypoth-
eses, p will remain constant in real terms throughout the Ufe of the contract so this variable will no longer influence traffic. 
Consequently, traffic will be a function of several exogenous variables (variables which are outside the model). 
The objective of this paper is not to dig into the causes that explain traffic growth, but rather to evalúate the influence of 
the ultimate profitability for the concessionaire in terms of an exogenous traffic growth. For this reason, I assume that traffic 
in time t will depend only on two exogenous variables: the traffic q0 in the first year of operation (year 0), and the annual 
traffic growth a. For the sake of simplification I consider that a is constant throughout the lifespan of the eoneession. Con-
sequently, the traffic volume for year t is calculated according to Eq. (4) in the following way: 
q(t) = q0 • eat (4) 
where q(t), annual traffic in year t; q0, annual traffic in year 0 (first year of operation); a, annual traffic growth rate. 
Regarding the incorporation of the maintenance and operation costs in the model, I establish that those costs can be split 
into a fixed and a variable part. The fixed part does not depend on traffic. For instance, the concessionaire will have to cut the 
grass, and keep the embankments in good repair, irrespective of the number of vehicles that ultimately will use the road. The 
variable part will depend on the ultímate number of vehicles that will use the road every year. This second part mostly re-
flects the wear and tear of the road pavement, costs that will vary depending on the number and size of the vehicles that 
travel. Eq. (5) shows how maintenance and operation costs are modeled. 
m(í) = mF + 6 • q0 • eat (5) 
where m(t), total maintenance cost in year t; mF, annual fixed maintenance and operation cost; 9, variable maintenance and 
operation cost per vehicle; a, annual traffic growth. 
Introducing Eqs. (4) and (5) in Eq. (3), and adopting the simplifications explained before, I obtain Eq. (6a), from which I 
easily obtain Eq. (6b). 
NPV0 = -lo + í [p • q0 • eat - mF - 6 • q0 • eat] • e-ndt (6a) 
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NPV0 = -lo + f (p-0)-q0- e(a"r>t • dt - f mF • e~n • dt (6b) 
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Eq. (6b) is easy to intégrate. As a result of that, I obtain Eq. (7), which enables me to calcúlate the net present valué in 
terms of the variables of the model. 
NPV0 = -J0 + (p - 0) • q0 • - L - • [1 - e<«-'>-r] - mf . 1 . [1 - e~fí] (7) 
The internal rate of return (IRR) obtained by the concession is the valué of the discount rate that makes the net present 
valué of Eq. (7) equal to zero. 
The procurement mechanism based on LPVR consists in awarding the concession contract to the bidder who offers the 
least present valué of the revenues—that is, the lowest valué of the accumulated revenues discounted at a certain discount 
rate /? established by the government in the contract. The rate /? fixed by the government does not necessarily have to coin-
cide with the WACC r estimated by each bidder.In order to win the tender, each bidder will try to offer the least present valué 
of the revenues under the restriction that its expected NPV0 should be always ^0 . This condition is achieved when Eq. (7) is 
equal to 0 and consequently the weighted average cost of capital r estimated by each bidder coincides with the internal rate 
of return (IRR) that each bidder expects to attain. Making NPV0 equal to 0,1 obtain Eq. (8), which is equivalent to Eq. (2) but 
using continuous time units instead of discrete time units. The left side of the equation shows the present valué of the costs 
and the right side of the equation shows the net present valué of the revenues PVR0(r). 
h + 6-q0-~[\- éa-0-T] + mf • i • [1 - e-rT] = fl. q „ . _ L - . [i _ e<«-')*] = PVR0(r) (8) 
where PVR0(r), Present valué of the revenues discounted at r. 
As many bidders can attend the tender, and each one of them can have different estimates of traffic, costs, and WACC, 
they can offer different present valúes of the revenues depending on their estimates. Eq. (9) shows the same relationship 
as Eq. (8), but this time, the equation is made specific for the estimates conducted by each bidder. In Eq. (9), the subscript 
E means "expected" and the superscript j refers to each one of the bidders. For instance, [q0]jE means the level of traffic in 
year 0 expected by bidder j . I have added the subscript E to the variables that the bidder has to estimate in the tender 
(J0, q0, a, mF, 9). 
[hí + 4 • [ a • — l — • [1 - eÚ-'ri] + [mF]i • 1 • [1 - e-^»] = 0F • [qJF • —^- • [1 - e<«HK] = PVE> ( ri) ( 9 ) 
P - oc}F v r> - oc}F 
where PVR0(r-'), present valué of the revenues needed by bidder j discounted at rJ; rJ, WACC estimated by bidder j ; [q0]jE, an-
nual traffic in year 0 expected by bidder j ; céE, annual traffic growth expected by bidder j ; 7^, term needed by bidder j to ob-
tain a rate of return equal to rJ. 
From Eq. (9), it is possible to calcúlate for each bidder the contract duration 7^ which, according to their estimates, would 
be necessary to achieve an internal rate of return (IRR) equal to the cost of capital rJ. The period 7^ is, then, the contract dura-
tion that, according to the estimates of each bidder, is necessary for the bidder to achieve a rate of return rJ equal to its cost of 
capital. 
However, as has already been mentioned, the discount rate /? imposed by the government on the bidders for their calcu-
laron of the present valué of the revenues does not have to coincide with the WACC rJ estimated by each bidder. Conse-
quently the present valué of the revenues offered by each bidder j PVRJ0(/J) does not have to coincide necessarily with the 
valué PVR,0(rí) from Eq. (9). Even though the government intends to make /? coincide with r, this is a real challenge due to 
asymmetrical information problems. 
The present valué of the revenues offered by each bidder will be given by Eq. (10) where, again, the subscript E means 
"expected" and the superscript j refers to each one of the bidders. 
PVR¿(/?) = p • [q0]{ • -Lj • [1 - eÚ-n-M (10) 
p-céE 
where PVRJ0(/J), present valué of the revenues offered by the bidder j ; [q0]jE, annual traffic in year 0 expected by the bidder j ; 
a,{, annual traffic growth expected by the bidder j . 
As the interaction among different bidders in the tender has now been explained, from now on I will focus my attention 
on the bidder who offers the least present valué of the revenues and consequently will end up becoming the concessionaire. 
The present valué of the revenues offered by the concessionaire will be given by Eq. (11), which is the same as Eq. (10) with-
out superscript j . For the sake of simplicity, I consider that the valúes without superscript j are the valúes estimated by the 
bidder who ultimately becomes the one selected to be the concessionaire. Eq. (11) shows how the lower the discount rate 
adopted by the government in the contract, the larger will be the LPVR requested by the concessionaire. 
PVRo(/?) = P • [q0]E • j ^ — • [1 - e<«*-»-r»] 
P — a £ (11) 
PVR0(/?) = min(PVRJ0) 
According to the LPVR procurement mechanism, the concession will come to an end at the time TR when the LPVR requested 
is ultimately reached. This condition is shown by Eq. (12). This equation is similar to Eq. (11), but the expected traffic vari-
ables [<7O]E and aE are replaced by the real traffic variables [q0]« and aR. Consequently, the valué TR that satisfies Eq. (12) will 
be the ultímate duration of the contract. Depending on how [q0]« and aR ultimately behave compared to [q0]E and aE the con-
tract duration can be either extended (TR > TN) or reduced (TR < TN). 
PVR0 (/?) = p • [q0]R • -*— • [1 - e<««-»-r«] (12) 
¡j — Ü.R 
Once the real term TR that will be determined in accordance with LPVR is calculated for different traffic scenarios, it is 
quite straightforward to estímate the net present valué ultimately reached by the concessionaire by introducing all the real 
variables—including the valué of TR previously calculated—in Eq. (7). This gives Eq. (13). The ultímate rate of return r¡ ob-
tained by the concessionaire will be the valué of the discount rate r¡ that makes Eq. (13) equal to 0 (see Eq. (14)). 
[NPVo], = -[I0]R + (p - 6R) • [q0]R • —l— • [1 - e<a«-»r«] - [mE]R • \• [1 - e ^ ] (13) 
[NPVo], = 0 = -[Jo], + (p - 6R) • [q0]R • — L - • [1 - e<*-*K«] - [mE]R • 1 • [1 - e ^ ] (14) 
í¡ (J.R íj 
The goal of the model that I develop in this paper is to estímate the actual rate of return r¡ obtained by the concessionaire 
as a function <P of the discount rate /? adopted by the government, for different traffic scenarios (see Eq. (15)). 
n = <£(/?, [q0]R - [q0]E, «* - 0%) (i 5) 
3.2. Results of the model 
Unfortunately, some of the equations I have developed in the previous section do not have an algebraic solution. For in-
stance, it is not possible to obtain an algebraic solution for TN from Eq. (9). Similarly, it is not possible to obtain an algebraic 
solution to obtain r¡ from Eq. (14). Consequently, it is not feasible to calcúlate in algebraic terms the derivative expression 
9<P/9j8 that shows whether r¡ increases or decreases with /?. In spite of this, it is still possible to obtain a numerical solution 
for these equations. For this reason, I can assess the different solutions for different scenarios implemented in a hypothetical 
case study. This way, the lack of an algebraic solution can be circumvented. 
To that end, I have decided to apply the model to a hypothetical case study. The characteristics of the hypothetical case 
study are based on average valúes of highway concession contracts in Spain. The variables adopted are J0 = €300 millions, 
p = 10 e/trip, qo = 3650 million trips/year, a = 2% annual, mE = €3 million, 9 = 2 €/trip, r = 7.5%. In addition, the máximum legal 
duration of the concession contract is assumed to be 30 years. 
Moreover, in order to simplify the results, I assume that all the variables behave as expected except the traffic growth a. In 
this respect, traffic deviation is defined as ocj; - aE. 
Fig. 1 graphically shows how the model behaves for two different discount rate scenarios: first, /? = r = WACC = 7.5%, and 
second, /? = 0%. The first scenario assumes that, even though the government is not able to know the private cost of capital, 
the government adopts a discount rate equal to the WACC of the project. The second scenario assumes that the government 
decides not to discount the revenues, as was the case for example with the Second Severn Bridge in the UK. The left graph 
within Fig. 1 shows the process that the concessionaire would have followed in order to estímate the present valué of the 
revenues to offer in the tender, according to the expected behavior of the variables of the concession. 
The curve with triangle-shaped data points represents the evolution throughout the years of the capital, maintenance, 
and operation costs (Capex + Opex) of the concession discounted at the WACC. The curve with square-shaped data points 
represents the evolution during the years of the accumulated present valué of the revenues. According to Eq. (2), the equi-
librium point of the concession will be the intersection of those two curves. The present valué of the revenues requested by 
the concessionaire, if the /? adopted by the government equals the WACC, will be €411.65 million. The expected duration of 
the concession will be 17.6 years. 
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Fig. 1. Concession duration depending on the discount rate fS when annual traffic growth is higher than expected. 
However, if the government decides to adopt a discount rate /? equal to 0%, the curve representing the evolution of the 
accumulated revenues will be that shown with circle shapes. If the government decides not to discount the revenues, the 
concessionaire will require in the tender a level of accumulated revenues that would correspond to 17.6 years of concession, 
which is the number of years necessary for the concessionaire to recoup its costs according to its cost of capital r. The amount 
to be required will be the intersection of the yellow curve with the vertical line corresponding to 17.6 years. The accumu-
lated revenues that the concessionaire will require for this scenario will be €770.32 million. 
The left graph in Fig. 1 shows what would have happened if the annual traffic growth a had been the expected annual 
traffic growth plus 4% (i.e. if the annual traffic growth expected was 2%, the real growth would be 2% + 4% = 6%). In this sce-
nario the revenue curve, discounted at the WACC (curve with square-shaped data points), and the revenue curve, not dís-
counted (curve with circle-shaped data points), will be steeper than they were in the expected scenario due to a greater 
traffic increase. Moreover, the maintenance and operation costs throughout the years will be higher than expected since 
more vehicles will accelerate the deterioration of the infrastructure. This fact explains why the curve with triangle-shaped 
data points is a little bit steeper in this scenario than it is in the original scenario. 
If the government has adopted a discount rate equal to 7.5%, the concession will expire when the curve with square-
shaped data points reaches the €410.65 million requested in the tender. This will occur after 12.36 years. However, if the 
government has chosen not to use any discount rate (that is, a discount rate equal to 0), the concession will expire when 
the curve with circle-shaped data points reaches the €770.32 million requested in the tender. This will occur after 
13.64 years. The upside to be obtained by the concessionaire will be higher if the government does not discount the revenues 
rather than if the government chooses to discount the revenues at the WACC, since, for a specific traffic scenario, the ultímate 
rate of return r¡ will depend only on the duration of the concession. 
Fig. 2 shows a sensitivity analysis around the discount rate /?. This analysis displays the ultímate rate of return r¡ obtained 
by the concessionaire in terms of the discount rate /? fixed by the government in the tender for different traffic growth devi-
ation scenarios. The continuous thick curve shows the ultímate rate of return r¡ obtained by the concessionaire when a = 0%, 
which means that the real traffic growth turned out to be exactly as expected. For this case, r¡ will be the same regardless of 
the valué of the discount rate /? adopted by the government in the tender. 
The set of curves made up of discontinuous long dashes shows the outcome when the real traffic growth turns out to be 
higher than expected. It is notable that the lower the valué of /? the higher will be the return for the concessionaire r¡. I have 
not included in this graph the outcome when /? is higher than the weighted average cost of capital r. This is because, when 
this happens, the higher the traffic growth, the lower will be the return obtained by the concessionaire, which does not make 
any sense from the perspective of the theory of incentives. Consequently, a first conclusión of this analysis is that the dis-
count rate /? used to procure a highway under the LPVR approach should never be higher than the WACC. Of course, because 
of asymmetrical information problems, the government is not able to know the private WACC adopted by the bidders. How-
ever, the government is still able to approach this valué either through experience or through financial models such as the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe, 1964). In any case, the government knows that the valué of the WACC adopted by the 
private sector will be no greater than the return on the risk-free public securities. 
The set of curves made up of discontinuous short dashes shows the outcome when the real traffic growth turns out to be 
lower than expected. In this case, the lower the discount rated /? adopted by the government the higher will be the return r¡ 
obtained by the concessionaire. However, in this case, I note a substantial difference. For the scenarios with large traffic devi-
ations, the reduction of the return r¡ is outstanding even for discount rates cióse to the WACC r. The reason for this behavior is 
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Fig. 3. Sensitivity of the return r¡ obtained by the concessionaire to the traffic growth depending on the procurement mechanism adopted. 
that a legal máximum term of 30 years is established in the contract, which limits the extensión of the contract to the point 
where the present valué of the revenues initially requested is ultimately achieved. This explains the uneven shape of the 
lowest of the short-stroke curves in Fig. 2. 
This figure graphically justifies the criticism made by the concessionaires to the LPVR mechanism—that the upside and 
the downside are not symmetric. On the one hand, the upside in cases of a positive deviation of the traffic growth is a little 
bit smaller that the downside that would occur when the traffic growth expected experiences the symmetric negative devi-
ation. Furthermore, the máximum term of the concession contract accentuates the asymmetry, particularly when the dis-
count rates adopted are cióse to the weighted average cost of capital. 
Fig. 3 shows the same results from a different point of view. Now the curves display the ultímate return r¡ for the con-
cessionaire in terms of the annual traffic growth deviation for three different procurement mechanisms adopted: first, a 
fixed-term contract, which is depicted by the thick continuous curve in black; second, the LPVR mechanisms with /? = 0%, 
depicted with square-shaped data points, which means that the revenues are not discounted—such as was the case with the 
Second Severn Bridge Concession in the UK; and third, the LPVR mechanisms with /? = WACC = 7.5%, depicted with circle-
shaped data points, which is basically the LPVR mechanism as it has been implemented in Chile. 
Several conclusions result from the analysis of Fig. 3. First, the traffic risk allocated to the concessionaire in a fixed-term 
contract is much higher than it is in the two scenarios of flexible-term contracts. Second, whereas 92^/9a2 = 0 for a fixed-term 
contract, 92^/9a2 < 0 for flexible-term contracts based on LPVR, which means that for the same traffic growth deviation, the 
upside obtained by the concessionaire will be lower than the downside. And third, the downside is even more accentuated 
when the discount rate /? approaches the valué of the weighted average cost of capital r due to the máximum limit estab-
lished for the contract's duration. 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
This research shows that, even though LPVR is a very interesting approach in both the procurement of highway conces-
sions and in the mitigation of traffic risk, there is still a lot of work ahead to evalúate the consequences of its application. This 
paper presents a first step in this analysis. To that end, I have developed a model that sheds some light on the effect that the 
discount rate /? fixed by the government in the contract has on the traffic-risk profile ultimately allocated to the concession-
aire. The conclusions of this research could be extremely useful for decisión makers who opt for using LPVR as a procuring 
mechanism to grant highway concessions. The conclusions are the following: 
The discount rate /? to be used in the LPVR should never be higher than the WACC estimated by the concessionaire. Other-
wise, the concessionaire will not have an incentive to attract more traffic to the concession. The government does not know 
the private WACC even though it is still able to make a reasonable estímate. For this reason, it is advisable that the govern-
ment choose a conservative discount rate cióse to the return on the risk-free public securities. 
The lower the valué of the discount rate /?, the higher will be the traffic risk allocated to the concessionaire. Despite this, 
any kind of flexible term contract allocates much less traffic risk to the concessionaire than a fixed-term contract. 
The establishment of a máximum concession term causes an accentuated asymmetry between the upside and the down-
side in terms of r¡ when the concession is awarded on the basis of the LPVR approach. This asymmetry becomes more pro-
nounced when the discount rate /? adopted by the government is cióse to the WACC and the contract sets up a máximum 
duration for the concession. 
The theoretical analysis conducted in this paper demonstrates that the opposition of the concessionaires to the imple-
mentation of the LPVR mechanism is justified, since LPVR substantially limits the upside but not the downside. This effect 
is particularly accentuated when /? is cióse to the WACC. 
The main policy implication of this research is that using low discount rates in the LPVR mechanism could have important 
advantages. First, the traffic-risk profile allocated to the concessionaire is still substantially mitigated compared to using 
fixed-term contracts. Second, unlike the case in which a discount rate /? cióse to the WACC is used, using a low discount rate 
allows the concessionaire to enjoy a certain upside if traffic eventually becomes higher than expected. And third, the down-
side caused by a máximum term established in the contract in case that traffic ultimately becomes lower than expected is 
not substantially different across different discount rates /?. 
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